When Truth Becomes Treason
The EU’s Quiet Crackdown on Free Speech
Silencing Dissent: How Council Decision 2025/966 Criminalizes Wartime Dissent in Europe
What if I told you that liking the wrong post could get your bank account frozen?
Not in Russia. Not in China. But in Europe—in 2025. And, soon, in the U.S. In Canada it has already happened, just ask the farmers who protested there last year.
A quiet EU Council decision passed this May has turned opinion into offense. Under the banner of "countering hybrid threats," the EU is now blacklisting its own citizens for social media posts that question the Ukraine war or criticize Western action in Iran. No trial. No warning. Just sanctions: frozen assets, travel bans, digital erasure.
This isn't just a European problem. These same tactics—financial deplatforming, speech-based targeting, rebranding dissent as disinformation—are being mirrored in Washington, London, and Ottawa. As Europe tests the limits of extrajudicial punishment in the name of security, the precedent is spreading fast.
If we don't understand what CFSP 2025/966 is doing now, we may soon be living under its logic—whether we live in Berlin or Boston, Rotterdam or Raleigh.
A Blogger Sanctioned for Speaking Out
Red Media’s site announcing its closure under EU pressure; this pro-Palestinian platform and its founder were sanctioned for “destabilising” narratives wsws.orgwsws.org.
On May 20, 2025, German blogger Alina Lipp woke up to find herself on an EU sanctions list – effectively branded an enemy of the state for her online posts about the Ukraine war. Lipp, who runs a Telegram channel covering Russia’s invasion, had no violent or espionage charges; her “crime” was speech. Along with fellow German Thomas Röper and Turkish journalist Hüseyin Doğru, Lipp became one of the first private citizens ever sanctioned by the EU. They now face asset freezes and travel bans for alleged “Russian propaganda,” marking an unprecedented crackdown on EU-based dissent riotimesonline.com. “For the first time the EU prohibits its own citizens from entering Europe. Freedom of speech in a ‘free, democratic Europe’ is finally dead,” Lipp wrote in response on eadaily.com. Her social media protest encapsulates the shock: ordinary Europeans are being punished – without trial – for questioning official war narratives.
What CFSP 2025/966 Changed: Speech Became Sanctionable
Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966, adopted 20 May 2025, dramatically expanded the EU’s arsenal for targeting “hybrid threats.” It amended a 2024 sanctions framework to add 21 people (and 6 entities) to the EU’s blacklist and broaden the criteria to include purely speech-based activities consilium.europa.eu. Previously, EU sanctions focused on those directly aiding warfare or hacking. Now, the scope explicitly covers online expression. The Decision’s language allows listing anyone “engaging in or supporting” actions of the Russian government that “undermine…security or stability” of the EU through:
Information manipulation and interference – in other words, propaganda or disinformation eur-lex.europa.eueur-lex.europa.eu.
Undermining democratic processes – e.g. disrupting elections or spreading narratives to erode trust in governments eur-lex.europa.eueur-lex.europa.eu.
Facilitating violent acts or protests – even indirectly supporting demonstrations deemed destabilizing eur-lex.europa.eueur-lex.europa.eu.
Under these broad criteria, digital speech acts can be equated with security threats. The text notably cites “coordinated information manipulation” as grounds for sanctions. This vague term – undefined in EU law – enabled officials to target individuals solely for online posts or media output. No proof of lies or violence is required; opinions that “undermine” the EU or support its adversaries now suffice as sanctionable offenses. In short, Decision 2025/966 turned certain forms of dissenting speech into a punishable act, treating keyboard warriors like combatants.
Censorship via Sanctions: Real Cases of Punished Speech
Decision 2025/966 is already being used to muzzle voices of dissent. Consider three concrete cases after May 20, 2025:
EU leaders justify these measures by arguing that hostile disinformation is a form of hybrid warfare. “Sanctions target actors undermining EU security through foreign-backed disinformation,” a 2025 EU Commission statement insisted riotimesonline.com. High Representative Kaja Kallas – driving the sanctions – cited internal data that Russian propaganda reached 150 million EU citizens in 2024 as a hybrid threat riotimesonline.com. By this logic, words and tweets can be as dangerous as weapons. NATO and EU doctrine increasingly view “information as a weapon,” normalizing swift executive action against those deemed to be amplifying enemy narratives riotimesonline.com.
Crucially, Decision 2025/966 blurs the line between legitimate dissent and state-directed subversion. The listed individuals are accused of “undermining security” merely by expressing certain views. For example, Thomas Röper, a German blogger living in Russia, runs the site “Anti-Spiegel” and regularly questions the Western narrative on Ukraine. The EU sanctions narrative says he “systematically disseminates misinformation…delegitimises the Ukrainian government…[and] legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation”, including serving as an “election observer” in a sham referendum eur-lex.europa.eu. In other words, Röper’s outspoken opinions and participation in Russian-sponsored events – not any violent act – were deemed a threat warranting sanctions. Likewise, Alina Lipp was listed for blogging pro-Russian views and reporting from Russian-occupied Donbas; she “systematically disseminates misinformation” and even entertains Russian troops on a TV channel, the EU claims eur-lex.europa.eu. By equating propaganda with material support for aggression, the Council decision treats these bloggers’ words as actionable offenses: “engaging in actions which facilitate an armed conflict in a third country”eur-lex.europa.eu.
Even Hüseyin Doğru, a Turkish journalist based in Germany, fell under sanctions for his online media outlet. His crime, per the EU: operating “Red Media,” which published content on contentious issues like the Israel–Palestine conflict that allegedly created discord eur-lex.europa.eu. The Council’s justification is striking – Red Media is accused of “spreading false information on controversial subjects” and even of “disseminating the narratives” of groups like Hamas to stir unrest in Europe eur-lex.europa.eu. During an anti-Israel protest at a German university, Red Media journalists live-streamed the event, which officials claim “facilitated the violent nature of the protest”eur-lex.europa.eu. Doğru is thereby accused of “indirectly supporting violent demonstrations” simply by reporting on them eur-lex.europa.eu. In effect, journalism that doesn’t align with EU/NATO viewpoints can be recast as abetting enemy aggression. As one observer warned, “any position that does not follow the official war narrative is declared ‘enemy propaganda’ and banned”wsws.org. This paradigm – speech as a security threat – sets a dangerous precedent where voicing unpopular views about the wars in Ukraine or Iran (or other conflicts) can be penalized as treachery.
Other listed cases follow a similar pattern. A French activist Sylvain Afoua (alias “Egountchi Behanzin”) was sanctioned for “spreading Russian narratives” about Ukraine on social media and for founding a dissident pan-African group eur-lex.europa.eu. A Czech-based Belarusian Natallia Sudliankova was blacklisted for “producing media products” that undermine EU values in Czechia (essentially, pro-Russian PR work) eur-lex.europa.eu. Even former officials like Viktor Medvedchuk and Oleg Voloshin – Ukrainians who didn’t agree with the main stream narrative – were added to the sanctions for their speech and political activities (promoting a “peace plan,” funding media campaigns, etc.) eur-lex.europa.eu. Notably, none of these individuals are accused of pulling triggers or hacking servers; it is their words, associations and ideological stances that have been criminalized by EU sanctions.
The financial toll on those sanctioned is severe. Asset freezes mean bank accounts are locked overnight. Funding prohibitions mean platforms like PayPal or Patreon, and even cryptocurrency exchanges, must bar transactions to these persons – or face penalties themselves riotimesonline.com. For example, when the British government sanctioned a UK-based blogger in 2022, he found “his assets and bank accounts frozen, his ability to earn a living crashed by the blocking of funding mechanisms” craigmurray.org.uk. The EU’s current measures are doing the same to Lipp, Röper, Doğru and others: they are cut off from the financial system. Travel bans add further isolation – Röper and Lipp, both based abroad, technically cannot transit through EU territory (Germany has discretion to let its citizens in) eur-lex.europa.eu. Such sanctions, usually reserved for terrorists and war criminals, are now wielded against bloggers and journalists. The chilling effect is unmistakable: “What we are witnessing is not public discourse, but orchestrated repression – legitimised by a media-generated myth of [security] threat,” Red Media wrote in its farewell message wsws.org. “Talking about genocide is criminalised…[this] is the global normalisation of repression”wsws.org.
Bypassing Courts and Rights: An Extrajudicial Toolbox
One of the most troubling aspects of CFSP 2025/966 is how it bypasses traditional legal safeguards. These sanctions are imposed by the European Council (i.e. member state governments) with no judicial process beforehand. The listed individuals were not charged with a crime or given a hearing to contest the allegations. As an op-ed noted, the “unelected Council, led by [Kaja] Kallas, [acted] without judicial oversight” riotimesonline.com. This raises grave due process concerns under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – especially Article 47, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and effective remedy. By freezing citizens’ assets and restricting their movement with the stroke of a pen, the Council arguably violated Article 47 riotimesonline.com. Those sanctioned can appeal to the EU’s General Court, but this is a slow, costly process, and success is far from assured. In fact, the Court of Justice has only a limited mandate to review CFSP foreign-policy sanctions (due to Article 275 of the TFEU) and historically only about 30% of challenges succeed riotimesonline.com. No independent judge reviewed the “evidence” (if any) behind claims that tweets or videos “undermined security.”
Article 11 of the EU Charter – freedom of expression – is another obvious casualty. European officials insist they support free debate, but in practice these sanctions “threaten freedom of expression,” as even mainstream analysts admit riotimesonline.com. Lipp and Röper’s pro-Russia views, “while controversial, do not clearly violate laws like incitement,” one commentator noted in their defense riotimesonline.com. Likewise, Doğru’s coverage of protests – however provocative – was journalistic activity, not a crime riotimesonline.com. By punishing speech, the EU is arguably breaching its Charter obligation to protect free expression. A 2024 Freedom House report had already warned that aggressive anti-disinformation policies can end up “suppress[ing] media,” directly contradicting the EU’s own Media Freedom Act riotimesonline.com. That warning now looks prescient. The EU’s move essentially imposes state censorship by sanction: voices deemed disloyal are silenced through financial strangulation and travel restrictions. This has raised alarms among civil liberties advocates. The World Socialist Web Site bluntly called the May 20 actions an “open attack on freedom of the press”, noting that Germany’s constitution (Article 5) explicitly bans censorship wsws.orgwsws.org. Indeed, the German government not only tolerated but reportedly spearheaded these EU listings – the sanctions list “bears the signature of the German government,” and officials in Berlin bragged on May 20 that “we are determined to continue along this path”wsws.org. Such coordination to punish speech at the EU level, outside national courts, “throws overboard” the democratic safeguards that Europeans take for granted wsws.org.
Article 7 of the Charter (respect for private life) may also be at stake. To designate people for online activity, authorities likely engaged in surveillance of their communications and social profiles and companies like Apple and Google provide the tools to do so. You can find detailed information on how they collude in my reports on Youtube (Your IPhone’s AI is spying on you, and Media Manipulation, Big Tech Censorship, and the Pentagon’s War on Public Opinion).
Moreover, once sanctioned, individuals often see their personal data shared widely with banks, tech firms, and border agencies to enforce measures – a privacy intrusion on unprecedented scale. And when people like Lipp had not only their own account but even relatives’ accounts closed as collateral damage (as occurred in her case during a prior probe disinfo.detector.media), it raises questions about familial privacy and guilt by association. The sanctions regime offers no clear avenue to contest these ancillary impacts, leaving fundamental privacy and reputational rights in limbo.
In summary, CFSP 2025/966 built an extrajudicial sanctions regime that sidesteps the judiciary and many basic rights. Affected citizens were not formally accused of a crime, yet they suffer punitive outcomes (asset seizure, travel ban) typically reserved for convicted criminals. This regime was presented as a quick tool to counter “hybrid warfare,” but its use against journalists and activists shows how easily it can circumvent constitutional freedoms. Even EU officials tacitly acknowledge the democratic deficit: the European Parliament had no say in these listings, and it has no power to reverse a Council sanctions decision . The usual checks and balances – independent courts, legislative oversight, transparency of evidence – are largely missing. As legal scholar Nico Krisch observed, without transparent evidence the sanctions risk being disproportionate and illegitimate riotimesonline.com. In trying to defend democracy from “hybrid threats,” is the EU chipping away at its own democratic foundations? That is the uncomfortable question now being asked.
Hybrid Censorship: A Dangerous Precedent for Democracy
By treating dissenting speech as equivalent to sabotage or terrorism, the EU and its allies are entering perilous territory for democratic norms. This approach sets a precedent: governments can designate certain viewpoints or media narratives as de facto security threats, punishable without trial under sanctions law. Critics warn this could have a broad chilling effect on public discourse, journalism, and academic debate. Who decides what constitutes “foreign information manipulation” versus legitimate opinion? The criteria are so broad that they could be extended to silence critics of any military or foreign policy. For instance, could questioning NATO operations or expressing support for an “enemy” state’s perspective be grounds for sanction in the future? The language of 2025/966 suggests yes – it talks of targeting those who “undermine the sovereignty or independence” of allies or “threaten stability” via influence campaigns eur-lex.europa.eu. This is an elastic mandate that a less scrupulous government could abuse to snare peace activists, opposition politicians, or dissident academics under the guise of combating “hybrid warfare.”
European authorities insist that “domestic dissent” isn’t the target – only “foreign-linked” actors are riotimesonline.com. A Council advisor in 2025 tried to reassure that the sanctions focus on those with clear Kremlin or Tehran ties, not ordinary citizens voicing unpopular views riotimesonline.com. And indeed, the initial individuals listed were mostly either non-EU nationals or EU citizens operating explicitly in concert with Russian state media or officials. However, the line between a “foreign agent” and a dissenter can be blurry – especially in the fever of wartime. The sanctioned German bloggers, for example, would argue they are independent voices, not Russian agents (even if their content aligns with Moscow’s narrative). The EU has effectively labeled them proxies of the Russian government eur-lex.europa.eu. This indicates a shift toward a McCarthyist paradigm: if your views coincide with the enemy’s talking points, you risk being deemed an enemy yourself. In the context of the conflict involving Iran, one can imagine similar measures. Expressing support for Iran’s diplomatic position or criticizing Western military action in the Middle East could easily be painted as “amplifying an adversary’s propaganda,” despite the fact that these actions are clearly illegal under international law! Decision 2025/966’s logic could extend to sanctioning, say, an EU citizen who vocally opposes bombing Iran (and is then accused of spreading “Iranian disinformation” or hurting troop morale).
This erosion of the distinction between legitimate dissent and disloyal subversion is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes, not liberal democracies. As one commentator put it, “the EU is creating a precedent for censoring unpopular media beyond the rule of law”wsws.org. If today it is pro-Russian bloggers, tomorrow it could be anti-war activists of any stripe. The “hybrid threat” framework risks becoming a catch-all rationale for political repression – a way to sidestep the messy business of open debate by classifying opponents as security risks. Ironically, this mirrors tactics used by the very adversaries the EU decries. Moscow regularly labels its domestic critics as “foreign agents” or traitors to silence them. Now the EU has its own version of that playbook, however well-intentioned its origins. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) noted in 2024 that democracies must be careful not to “emulate that which we seek to counter” when responding to disinformation. Sanctioning speech can indeed make the EU look as if it’s copying authoritarian methods, undermining the moral high ground. As the WSWS analysis observed, “in view of the preparations for war…, any position that does not follow the official line is [being] banned”wsws.org. This is a profoundly illiberal trend that could corrode the very democratic values the EU claims to defend against Russia.
Coordinated Crackdown: A Transatlantic Trend?
Europe’s move to weaponize sanctions against speech is not occurring in isolation. Allied governments, including the US, UK, and Canada, have been increasingly aggressive in countering “foreign” information influence, though their methods vary. In the United States, First Amendment protections make it difficult to sanction Americans for mere speech, but the US has still taken steps that rhyme with the EU’s approach. In September 2024, for example, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned top Russian media figures and outlets – including RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan – for alleged malign influence campaigns targeting U.S. elections nationalheraldindia.com. The Justice Department simultaneously seized dozens of web domains and even indicted employees of Russian state media under espionage-related charges . The rationale was the same as Europe’s: to “hold state-sponsored actors accountable for activities that aim to deteriorate public trust in our institutions.”nationalheraldindia.com In April 2025, the U.S. announced a new visa-ban policy to bar foreign officials involved in “flagrant censorship” or disinformation on social media reuters.com. While these U.S. actions target foreign nationals (and foreign propaganda directed at Americans), they reflect a shared transatlantic view that information warfare is a real and present danger – one that may justify extraordinary measures. Washington has so far stopped short of sanctioning its own citizens for online speech, a line the EU has now crossed. But the coordination is evident: U.S. and EU officials frequently share intelligence on disinformation networks, and NATO’s Centre of Excellence on Strategic Communications aligns Western policies on countering “fake news.” The EU’s sanctions were “tailored and sustained…proportionate to the ongoing threat,” European leaders said, and part of using “the full range of tools” against hybrid attacks consilium.europa.eu. American security officials echo this wartime footing, describing propaganda as an enemy weapon to be “countered with all tools available”nationalheraldindia.com.
The United Kingdom has closely synchronized with the EU’s approach. On the same day the EU adopted its 17th package (including Decision 2025/966), the UK unveiled a sweeping sanctions package of its own (May 20, 2025). London’s measures likewise targeted Russian “propaganda networks,” notably sanctioning the “Social Design Agency” – a Kremlin-linked influence outfit – and key individuals associated with it harneys.com. UK officials underscored they were “aligning with international efforts like the EU’s 17th sanctions package,” presenting a united front harneys.com. The UK Foreign Secretary at the time emphasized that disinformation is part of Russia’s war effort, and the UK even signaled willingness to sanction British nationals if they were found assisting Russian evasion or propaganda efforts harneys.com. (In fact, the UK had already sanctioned one of its own citizens, video-blogger Graham Phillips, back in 2022 for “promoting Putin’s war,” seizing his assets in an unprecedented act craigmurray.org.uk.) Canada and other G7 partners have similarly followed suit by blacklisting Russian state media channels, banning Russia Today and Sputnik broadcasts, and in some cases sanctioning foreign persons disseminating disinformation. So far, Ottawa and others have not sanctioned their own citizens for online speech, but Canadian ministers voiced strong support for the EU’s hybrid sanctions and have tightened laws against “foreign interference.”
This emerging transatlantic consensus treats digital dissent aligned with hostile powers as a security issue, not just a matter of free speech. Allies are increasingly synchronizing enforcement: for instance, after the EU listed Lipp and Röper, the UK and Canada quickly added the same individuals to their travel-ban lists (to prevent circumvention via those territories) – a symbolic but telling gesture of unity. Western intelligence agencies now routinely share data on social media influence operations, meaning a person flagged in one country could easily end up sanctioned in another. In NATO circles, this is framed as “defending the cognitive domain” of warfare. But civil libertarians worry about a race to the bottom: democracies may collectively adopt the censorship tools of autocracies. “We must ensure we do not mirror the adversary,” warned a Carnegie Endowment report in 2024, noting that strategies to combat disinformation can “encroach on domestic speech” if unchecked riotimesonline.com. The EU’s latest actions will test how far Western liberal societies are willing to go in trading off free expression for security.
What Next? Legal Challenges, Backlash, and the Fight for Rights
The implementation of Decision 2025/966 has triggered a robust debate within Europe about how to balance security and civil liberties. Legal challenges are already percolating. Those sanctioned, like Alina Lipp and Red Media’s team, are reportedly preparing to appeal to the European Court of Justice on human rights grounds. They face hurdles – appeals can take years, and as noted, only a minority succeed – but a court battle will at least compel the EU to present evidence for its accusations in a legal forum. One barrier for sanctioned persons is resources: with assets frozen, funding a legal defense is difficult. (EU courts have sometimes granted limited unfreezing for legal fees, but it’s discretionary riotimesonline.com.) Still, we can expect some of these cases to reach Luxembourg, where judges will have to grapple with novel questions: Can blogging be equated to “threatening the security of the Union” in a legal sense? Does the Charter allow sanctions on EU citizens for influencing opinions? A key point of contention will be the evidentiary threshold: The Council gave no specific instances of false or unlawful speech in many listings riotimesonline.com, relying on general statements that individuals spread “misinformation.” Courts may demand more proof that these people knowingly and materially aided Russia’s hostile actions. If the EU cannot substantiate beyond political rhetoric, judges could annul some listings for being overly vague or unsupported – as they have in past sanctions cases involving lack of evidence. A 2023 study cited by the Council itself showed courts are willing to overturn sanctions when due process is clearly violated riotimesonline.com. The outcome of these appeals will be pivotal in setting limits on this new tool.
Beyond the courts, public backlash and political opposition are brewing. Press freedom organizations and civil society groups are alarmed at the precedent. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has hinted at concern that EU states are “using national security to muzzle reporters”, and the European Federation of Journalists condemned the inclusion of media workers on a sanctions list as “a dangerous step that could be misused to stigmatize journalism”. These groups are lobbying members of the European Parliament to intervene. While the Parliament cannot undo Council decisions, it can hold hearings and apply pressure. Already, some Green and Left MEPs have questioned Kallas and von der Leyen on whether sanctioning bloggers is compatible with European values, citing Article 11 of the Charter. This political pushback might lead to more oversight or clearer guidelines on how far such sanctions can go. For instance, there are calls for a “sunset clause” that would require renewals to be justified with fresh evidence each year, rather than making these bans effectively permanent. Others propose carving out exceptions so that EU journalists cannot be listed simply for speechunless it directly incites violence. Even some centrist lawmakers who support fighting disinformation argue that judicial oversight must be added: an independent body or court should review the Council’s designations in sensitive cases. Without such checks, they warn, the EU risks sliding down a slippery slope.
Meanwhile, the individuals affected are not remaining silent. They have taken to alternative platforms (like Telegram, Odysee, and Russian social media) to tell their side. Thomas Röper, for one, gave an interview (on a sympathetic YouTube channel outside the EU) where he asked pointedly: “Were we ever contacted by a court or given a chance to defend ourselves? Never. I woke up sanctioned. The content that triggered this – it wasn’t violence or hacking, it was journalism.” Such personal stories are fueling public debate about whether the EU’s response is proportionate or draconian. In Germany, even some voices in mainstream media express unease; after all, today it’s a fringe blogger, but tomorrow could it be a more mainstream critic of government policy? The “chilling effect” is already visible: anecdotal reports suggest that some academics and journalists have pulled back from voicing unconventional views on Ukraine or Iran, worried they might be seen as echoing Russian or Iranian “talking points.” This self-censorship is exactly what authoritarian regimes seek to instill – a bitter irony if it takes hold in Europe.
On the other hand, many Europeans support a hard line against so called disinformation. Polls show strong public backing for sanctions on Russia and its proxies (around 68% approval) riotimesonline.com. However, notably that support drops when it comes to targeting EU citizens and journalists riotimesonline.com. This suggests the EU must tread carefully or risk a public opinion backlash if citizens perceive that their freedoms are being curtailed under the pretext of fighting Putin’s trolls. The issue could become salient in upcoming elections – indeed, European Parliament elections in 2024 were cited by the Council as a justification for these measures (to prevent interference) eur-lex.europa.eu. But if voters feel free speech is being sacrificed, it could become a rallying point for anti-establishment parties. Paradoxically, heavy-handed censorship could feed the very “anti-EU” sentiment that Russia loves to stoke.
Looking ahead, we are likely to see a period of contestation and calibration. The courts may prune the most egregious listings, the EU might refine its definitions of “information manipulation” (perhaps requiring a clear foreign funding link or intent to destabilize), and guidelines may be set for protecting EU citizens’ rights even as hostile propaganda is countered. There are also discussions about establishing an independent review panel for hybrid threat designations – a sort of “sanctions court” that could quickly vet proposed listings for credibility, giving the accused a chance to respond in confidence before sanctions hit. Such an idea, if implemented, could restore some due process without entirely giving up the speed of executive action. Additionally, digital platform policies might evolve: rather than governments directly blacklisting speakers, authorities could work with social media companies to demote or label content from suspected disinformation sources, thus countering influence without resorting to financial punishment. This is a more nuanced approach some experts advocate, to strike a balance.
The fundamental challenge remains: defending open societies from real information warfare, without destroying the openness that defines them. Council Decision 2025/966 was born of legitimate worries – Europe is under constant assault from malicious cyber and propaganda campaigns, and its leaders feel compelled to “take off the gloves.” But as one EU analyst warned, “by targeting citizens and journalists, you risk normalizing broader repression if unchallenged”riotimesonline.com. The coming months will reveal if Europe can recalibrate this strategy. Will the EU uphold its democratic ideals by refining or rolling back the more extreme aspects of these sanctions? Or will it double down, expanding the list of speech-crimes in the next crisis? Citizens, courts, and activists will play a crucial role in that decision. As this saga unfolds, one thing is clear: Europe’s response to hybrid war is testing the resilience of its own democracy. The world is watching to see whether the EU can win the information war without losing its soul – the very freedoms of thought and expression that distinguish it from its adversaries.
I'm an anarchist. I'm literally an enemy of the "State." And this is exactly why. Governments are bad. Nation states should not exist.
You’re so right Tom. The US has problems on its hands and from several fronts simultaneously and soon. I’d love to see US come together both in reason and in struggle but I suspect the determined immorality that has guided the majority so far has not suddenly matured and will likely continue with vanity and division perpetually even when our backs are against the wall. Thank you for publicly exposing these savage truths.